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Abstract
We partially modify the rules of the Minority Game (MG) by introducing some
degree of local information in the game, which is only available for some agents,
called the interacting agents. Our work shows that, for small values of the new
parameter of the model (the fraction of interacting agents), there is an improvement
of the use of the resources with respect to the MG, while as this number grows the
response of the system changes, and ends up behaving worst than the usual MG.
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1 Introduction
The minority game (MG) is an adaptive game suitable to study competitive
systems whose available resources are finite [1]-[3]. In spite of the simplic-
ity of the rules of the game, it presents a very rich behavior and interesting
properties.
In this game there is a number of players (agents) that must choose, indepen-
dently, one of two alternatives at each time step, splitting into two groups. The
winners are those who stay at the minority side in that step. As we explain
in the next section, there are three main ingredients in the game: (i) a pub-
lic history, with the information of the m previous minority sides; (ii) some
prescriptions (strategies) to play with, and (iii) a reward system, whereby
points are given to winning agents and strategies. These ingredients induce an
emergent coordination whereby the system can be more efficient (in a sense
explained below) than a random game. In fact, this is the main reason for the
interest shown by many people on the behavior of the model.
1 email: caridi@cnea.gov.ar
2 email: ceva@cnea.gov.ar
Preprint submitted to Elsevier Science 1 November 2018
A recent line of research introduces modifications into the MG, designed to
approach the behavior of the players to that of the agents in a real market.
Agents in an economy take decisions based on heterogeneous external informa-
tion available at each time, plus internal information, including their personal
preferences. The heterogeneous external information can be either global, such
as an aggregate variable, or local. Some of those investigations study the effect
of changes in the external information available in the MG. The work of M.
Paczuski et al. [4] develops a version of Kauffman’s model with certain rules
of the MG. Other works introduce versions of the MG with local information.
Between these, that of Kalinowski et al. [5] places the agents on a circle; every
agent gets the previous decisions of her (m − 1) neighbors (half to her right,
half to her left) as an input information; together with her own decision, she
builds up a history of m bits. In this form there is a local history for each
player. The rest of the rules are as in the usual MG. S. Moelbert et al. [6]
recently introduced a local MG, where they use a local determination of the
minority and the corresponding local histories.
In this work some kind of local information will be made available to a fraction
p of the N agents (0 ≤ p ≤ 1); we will refer to them as the interacting agents.
As we will see, they will be able to change their original decisions, in order to
be in the minority of their neighborhoods.
In the next section we describe the model, and present the results found; in
section 3 some conclusions are drawn.
2 The MG with interactions
2.1 The model
In the MG model there are N agents, each one with s strategies distributed at
random (with reposition) at the beginning of the game. The strategies assign
one output (0 or 1) for every one of the 2m possible inputs (i.e., histories). As
a result of their choices, at each step of the game the players split into two
groups of size N0 and N1, such that N0 + N1 = N . Every winner agent gets
a point after each step of the game. Besides, out of all the strategies playing
in the game, those that correctly predict the minority side of the time step t,
obtain a reward, called a virtual point. The agents use the virtual points to
establish the performance of her strategies and to choose, at each step of the
game, the more successful one to play with.
The main variable considered in this model is σ, the standard deviation of the
2
difference (N1 −N0)
σ2 =
1
T
T∑
t=1
(N1 −N0)2 (1)
where T is the number of time steps of the game. This variable measures the
form in which the resources of all the players are used. When | N1 − N0 |
is small, the minority group is bigger, and the agents, as a whole, receive
more points. Hence, smaller values of σ indicate a better use of the resources
by the population. As mentioned above, the interest on this model is mainly
due to the fact that for certain values of the variables m, s, and N, the
standard deviation turns out to be smaller than in the case of a random game.
The characterization of this collective behavior generated many studies of the
MG, with a variety of techniques: numerical simulations [1], [7]; mean-field
approximations [8]; equivalence with spin-glass models [9]; thermal treatments
[10]; etc.
To introduce local information, we need to arrange the agents in such a form
that it makes sense to talk about the neighborhood of every one of them.
Hence, we distribute all the players on a square lattice with periodic boundary
conditions. The positions of the pN interacting agents on the lattice are chosen
randomly, at the beginning of the game. At each time step the agents follow
the usual rules of the MG, but the interacting agents (I.A.) are given the extra
opportunity to modify their bets, after knowing what their nearest neighbors
I.A. will do in the same step. As they were distributed randomly, every
one of them can have between zero and four I.A. as nearest neighbors. This
agent will try to be in the minority of the group formed by her I.A. nearest
neighbors, plus herself. Hence, if more than half of her neighbors choose one
side, then the I.A. will chose the other, regardless of what her best strategy
says; but if half of the neighbors choose each side, then the I.A. will decide in
agreement with the prescription of her best strategy, i.e. the one with more
virtual points. With this rule, she can eventually choose one option that none
of her strategies prescribe for a given history. Once all the agents have made
their choice, they make their moves simultaneously. Finally, one obtains the
minority as usual, by considering the actions of all the players. As far as the
players are concerned, points are distributed with the same rule than in the
MG, but whenever a player wins because she plays against the majority of her
local neighborhood, then no points are added to her strategies.
The fact that the I.A. positions are chosen randomly raises the question of the
relevance of the actual number of links between interacting agents, ℓ, for every
specific realization (i.e. for every sample), for a fixed value pN. We considered
this factor, and found that in this case it only has minor effects [11].
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Fig. 1. Reduced variance µr as a function of z, for N=225 agents, and several values
of p, indicated in the inset. Out of a total of 105 time steps, data was collected in
the last 9× 104 steps.
2.2 Results
We have made extensive numerical simulations, finding σ2/N as a function of
both p and 2m/N . In the following we will refer to µr ≡ σ2/N as the reduced
variance, and use z ≡ 2m/N, for short. As is well known [7], the graph of µr vs
z displays two different informational behaviors: an efficient phase for z < zc,
and an inefficient phase for bigger values of z. Qualitatively, zc is the greatest
value of z for which the system is dominated by a period-two, maladaptive
dynamics that is explained below.
In Fig.1 we can see the ensuing changes in the reduced variance, as p increases
from p = 0, i.e. the MG with no interacting agents, to p = 1, when all the
agents are interacting. For small values of p the function µr(z) has a shape
similar to that of the MG case, but there is a shift to the left of its minimum,
implying an improved efficiency for small values ofm. Moreover, the minimum
µmin is smaller than the corresponding MG value. As p increases, the shape
of the curve changes, and for p = 1 the reduced variance is roughly constant,
and the efficiency is clearly worst than in the MG case.
In the following we will restrict ourselves to consider the first, informationally
efficient region. We now will relate this behavior with the crowd - anticrowd
picture [7], [12].
The minority game has, for m = 2, a remarkable period-two dynamics (PTD),
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Fig. 2. Reduced variance µr as a function of p, for m = 2. The different values of
the reduced variance are calculated using σe (empty circles), the whole dispersion
σ (filled squares), and σo (empty triangles).
whereby during the odd appearances of a given history, the resulting minority
is random, but then in the following, even appearance, the minority is just
the opposite to the previous one. Moreover, if we distinguish even and odd
occurrences of the histories, i.e. we calculate the standard deviation σe(σo) for
the time steps in which the histories occur an even (odd) number of times, it
turns out that σo is of the order of
√
N/4, while σe ≫ σo. If m = 2, this is
true for almost all the steps of the game; as m increases, this rule is true only
in a (decreasing) number of steps, and when z ≈ 10 or greater, the opposite
happens: the ‘even’ minority tends to be the same than the previous, ‘odd’
one. This was first observed and explained by Manuca et.al. [7], as due to the
formation of crowds (see also [12], [13]). In a few words, this happens as follows:
during the first (odd) occurrence of a history, the strategies of the players have
the same amount of virtual points, and therefore they will pick side randomly,
so that N0 ≈ N1; thereafter, the winner strategies will get a point. During the
second (even) appearance of the same history, agents having those strategies
will bias the outcome, choosing the same side as before. Hence, the minority
will be just the opposite than the previous one; on the other hand, N0 and N1
will be very different, so that σe ≫ σo. Now the strategies receiving virtual
points are those complementary to the first set; in this form all strategies have
roughly the same amount of points, closing a ‘cycle’.
We begin by studying the effect of the interactions on the m = 2 case; as
we will see, for small values of p the system still follows the PTD, but as p
increases the period-two regime will disappear.
Figure 2 shows data for µr as a function of p, for N =361, 1089 and 3721 (these
are just three representative examples of all the cases we have considered). We
discarded the first 104 time steps for N = 361, and 5 104 for bigger values of
N , and collected data along the next 105 time steps. All the results shown are
averages over 32 independent realizations.
Each set has three curves, µor(p), µ
e
r(p) and µr(p),corresponding to the odd,
even and total number of appearances of the histories, respectively. It is easy
to distinguish three regions: (i) zone 1, where µor(p) ≈ 0.25 ≪ µer(p). This is
the PTD region, as can be verified by the simple observation of the record
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of minorities. As it is known, 0.25 is the expected value for a random set;
(ii) zone 2, an intermediate region where µor(p) is no longer that of a random
process, but still µor(p) < µ
e
r(p); and finally, (iii) zone 3, a region where the
even and odd curves coincide and, therefore, there is no PTD present. Notice
that the width of the intermediate zone shrinks as N increases. For m = 2 and
N = 3721, the 3rd zone starts at p∗ ≃ 0.5 (this value has only a moderate
size effect).
The behavior for small values of p can be understood as a simple extension of
the behavior of the MG: there is only a small number of I.A., so that they can
reduce somewhat the value of σ, but can not change the general outcome of the
game. It is also possible to explain in simple terms the behavior for p = 1. In
this case, all the players are interacting, hence each one has a neighborhood of
4 I.A. Let us assume, for the sake of concreteness, that the minority outcome
for an odd appearance of a given history is M = 1; we could expect that in
the next (even) appearance of the same history, the majority of the players
will pick the same side, as the PTD indicates. With the new rules, however,
there is an extra opportunity for all the players. Now, most of the agents
will notice that their neighbors will chose ‘1’, and therefore each one in this
condition will, in turn, change her bet. As a result, the majority will chose
‘0’, and the minority will again be ‘1’; virtual points are given to the same
group of strategies than before, in agreement with the previous crowd effect:
each history will be followed always by the same answer. One consequence of
this behavior, is that the system will fall into a cyclic evolution, with a period
equal to 4 (the number of histories), or smaller.
Notice that, in general, p∗ is a function of z, p∗(z). In the region between p∗
and p = 1, the system behaves qualitatively in the same form. We found it
appropriate to analyze the sequence of minorities of the game, {Mi}, deter-
mining the entropy rate [14] of the set. The entropy rate of n random variables
{Xi} measures how does the entropy of the sequence growth with n. If the
stochastic process is a stationary Markov chain, the entropy rate HT (X) can
be written as follows:
HT (X) = −
∑
i,j
λiPij log2 Pij (2)
In this equation, λ = (λ1, λ2, ...) is a vector whose components are the station-
ary probabilities of X1, X2, etc. P is a probability transition matrix, whose
elements measure the probability of the transition between the states i and j,
i.e. Pij = prob{Xn+1 = j|Xn = i}. The reason to consider here this magnitude
is the following: if the sequence ofm-histories resulting from {Mi} has a cyclic
behavior, the corresponding entropy rate is zero, because in this case Pij is
either 0 or 1. In other words, HT is an efficient detector of cyclic behavior.
From a physical point of view, once one knows in what kind of cycle is the
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Fig. 3. Entropy rate HT as a function of p, for N = 3721 agents and m = 2. The
symbols representing the different word sizes are shown in the inset. In this case
p∗ ≃ 0.5. Notice that for p < p∗, and L ≤ m the entropy rate is HT = 1, while for
p > p∗ and L ≥ m the entropy rate is HT = 0.
system, there is no uncertainty about the next time step; that is the reason
why the entropy rate vanishes.
The set {Mi} can be studied by forming M −L+1 ‘words’ of length L out of
the sequence ofM minority sides; two successive words will share L−1 values,
or bits; thus for example if we want to look at words of length L = 3, and the
sequence of minorities is represented by ...abcde... (where each letter can take
the values 0, 1) one word will be ‘abc’ and the following ‘bcd’, etc. [15]. We
determined HT form = 2, 5 and 8, and several values of p in the interval {0,1},
using word sizes L = 1 to 10 (see Fig.3). For p & p∗ we found that HT ≈ 0,
indicating the presence of a cyclic evolution. In fact, a close inspection of the
series of minority sides shows that for p in the interval {p∗, 1}, the system falls
in a cyclic motion for a rather long number of time steps, until it suddenly
switches to another cycle, and so on. The contribution to the entropy rate
from the transition time steps between two different cycles is very small, but
noticeable. As p approaches p = 1, the change of cycle becomes more and
more uncommon.
Two other aspects of the results shown in Fig.3 deserve to be emphasized. In
the first place, it is rather clear that the general behavior of the entropy rate
follows that of the reduced variance, in the sense that both show two different
‘phases’, for the same values of p: one ‘phase’ for p ≤ p∗, and a different one
for p > p∗. On the other hand, the entropy rate is roughly constant in the
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Fig. 4. Entropy rate as a function of p, for m = 5 and 8. We use the same symbols
as in Fig.3. For clarity we only show results for selected values of L.
p-region where the system follows the PTD. Moreover, the entropy rate for
L ≤ m takes the value HT ≃ 1, showing that for these word sizes the minority
set is essentially random. Indeed, it follows from the MG rules that each step
i of the game can only be followed by one of the two possible outcomes (i.e.
either a zero or a one); if the behavior is random, it turns out that Pij can
only be equal to zero (if i and j can not be connected by the MG rules) or
1/2. On the other hand the summation over the λ values in Eq.2 will be equal
to one; therefore it follows that HT = 1 for a random set built with the MG
rules. Following the description of Manuca et.al [7], it can be said that one
can not get information ‘hidden’ in {Mi} by using words of length L ≤ m:
this will only be possible if one uses words one bit (or more) longer than m.
Figure 4 shows results for m = 5 and 8. It can be seen that they are similar
to those described above for m = 2, the main difference being that the value
of p∗ gets smaller as m increases. Notice that for N=3721, the case with m=8
has z ≃ 0.07, i.e. it still belongs to the first region.
3 Conclusions
We have studied a modification of the rules of the Minority Game, hoping to
retain the main ideas of the model, and at the same time introducing a more
realistic description of the agents. This was done through the introduction
of certain number of interacting agents, that can know the decisions of their
nearest neighbors, before they make their choice. As a result, the efficiency
of the system improves if the fraction p of I.A. is small, but it is worst when
this fraction approaches p ≃ 1. The relation of the reduced variance µr with
p, for z < zc resembles the relation of µr with m; in fact, for every value of z
there is an optimal value of p, p∗(z), for which one has the minimum value of
µr. Thus, for a small fraction of I.A. the system remains in the PTD regime,
sweeping through the whole set of histories; but when this fraction is greater
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than p∗(z) (but still within the first, informationally efficient region), it falls
into a cyclic, and in general non ergodic motion. In this sense, the use of the
entropy rate proved to be a sensible tool to study the sequence of histories
visited.
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